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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE. OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH, by and through
its ENGINEERING COMMISSION,
D. H. Whittenburg, Chairman, H.
Corleissen and Layton Maxfield, Members of the ENGINEERING COMMISSION,

l

J.l

Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No.

8290

-vs.(Fred Tedesco) et al., and BURTON
F. PEEK and CHARLES D. WIMAN, Trustees under the Will and of
the Estate of CHARLES H. DEERE,
Deceased,
Defendants and Respondents.

I
j.

RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING

Respondents respectfully request a rehearing of the
above cause on the following ground:
(1) The court erred in its decision that "The test is
not what the lots will bring when and if 62 willing buyers
come along, but what the tract as a unit, and as is, platted
or not, and in whatever state of completion, will bring
from a willing buyer of the whole tract."
1
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If that statement was intended to mean what it seems
to say, then the ruling is in contravention of Section 7834-10, Utah Code 1953; of Article I of Section 22, Constitution of Utah, and of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Section 1, of the Constitution of the United States, in
that said ruling would authorize the taking of respondants' property without just compensation and without
due process of law.
BRIEF

1.
POINT

A condemner is not, by r~on of his singleness, entitled
to a discounted price.

We are here concerned with Parcel 1 only, and of
Parcell, only sub-parcels A and B.
By this petition it is sought to clarify the court's
statement quoted and here repeated as follows:
"The test is not what the lots will bring when
and if 62 willing buyers come along, but what the
tract as a unit, and as is, platted or not, and in
whatever state of completion, will bring from a
willing buyer of the whole tract."
If that statement was intended to mean literally what it
would seem to say, then we respectfully submit that one
will search in vain for authority to support it, either in
the citations set forth in the court's opinion or anywhere
else, so far as we are informed. It is out of step with the
court's reasoning expressed in its opinion and the uni2
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versal rule, which quite obviously it is the court's intention to follow.

vVe concur in the court's conclusion that the experts
must take into consideration all costs reasonably to be
anticipated as those to be incurred after July 12, 1951
necessary to the marketing of these lots ; and like the
opinion of an expert responsive to an hypothetical question, the record must fully and accurately encompass the
factual basis upon which the expert's opinion shall restotherwise the opinion will be irrelevant and inadmissible
and on motion should be stricken.
The question is as to the fair market value on July
12, 1951 of the property condemned-the whole tract of
course, and in its then condition, but that does not imply
that the State may conjure up a fictitious purchaser and
discount the fair market value of the tract on July 12,
1951, by whatever amount may be thought sufficient to
assure this imaginary creature a profit sufficient to interest him in doing the very thing these respondents were
doing, i.e., selling the tract in lot units to purchasers,
whatever their number, who might come to buy.
The State might just as well attempt to defend its
seizure of a part of the tract without paying for it, as to
assume that, as to these respondents, the tract was of
less than its market value because the State had made
it impossible for respondents to continue to sell in
lot units to those willing to buy. Two parties are necessary to a sale and respondents were not discounting
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the tract's market value to enable some one else to step
in at a discounted figure and carry the project to the
very conclusion to which the respondents were committed.
What such an imaginary individual, pursuing the fiction,
might be willing to pay for the tract whereby to usurp
respondents' rightful function, by himself selling it in lot
units to others, bears no relation whatever to the issue
before the court, namely, what was the fair market value
of the tract on July 12, 1951, viewed from "the most advantageous use in the future to which the land may be
reasonably applied."
It is respectfully submitted that a condemner may
not so arbitrarily subject the owner to such fantastic presumptions. Respondents had no intention of liquidating their enterprise, and the market value of their
property cannot be measured on the basis of a forced
sale in liquidation. Respondents had not labored
and planned over the years merely to bring their project
to the final stage of fruition, then to unload and voluntarily surrender their profit by selling for a price discounted sufficiently to enable another to reap their harvest. The value of an owner's right to sell his tract in
such manner as to realize from such sale the greatest
possible return, whatever number the purchasers, is a
very substantial part of the fair market value of the
tract, of which the owner may not be deprived. What
is sought here is the damage sustained by respondents because deprived of their right. Any contrary conclusion
belies the very authorities upon which the court relies,
and accordingly we cannot think the court intended by
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its language to announce any other decision than that so
expressed in the universal rule. But such is the State's
theory, and .it is the very antithesis of just or fair compensation. It is a denial of compensation, it precludes
a recovery of fair market value because it forbids consideration of the principle element of fair market value,
i.e., "the most advantageous use to which the property
may reasonably be applied," and eliminates the very
use to which the respondent owners were applying the
land and to which it was the purpose of respondents to
continue to apply it.
A condemner is not, by reason of his singleness,
entitled to a discounted price.
CONCLUSION
Whatever may be the correct interpretation of the
court's statement, not only should the court below be
advised in language susceptible to no other interpretation, but the parties also should be made aware in no
uncertain language, of just what issue they will be required to meet in the further progress of this litigation.
Respectfully submitted,
C. C. PARSONS,
A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. BEHLE,
Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents.
KEITH E. TAYLOR,
Of Counsel.
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